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We study cross-country insurance for members of a currency union using an open
economy model with nominal price and wage rigidities. We provide two results that
build the case for the creation of a fiscal union within a currency union. First, we show
that, if financial markets are incomplete, the value of gaining access to any given level
of insurance is greater for countries that are members of a currency union. Second,
we show that, even if financial markets are complete, private insurance is inefficiently
low. A role emerges for government intervention in macro insurance to both guar-
antee its existence and to influence its operation. The efficient insurance arrangement
can be implemented by contingent transfers within a fiscal union. The benefits of such
a fiscal union are larger, the bigger the asymmetric shocks affecting the members of
the currency union, the more persistent these shocks, and the less open the member
economies.
1 Introduction
The ongoing crisis in the eurozone patently exposes the weakness of a currency union that
is not also a fiscal union. Macroeconomic imbalances and the ineffectiveness of a single
monetary policy to cope with asymmetric shocks across its members are coupled with
liquidity and solvency problems in banks and sovereigns. Opinions oscillate between
predicting the inevitable breakup of the monetary union, or suggesting its salvation by
furthering the ties using some combination of a fiscal, banking and political union.
This paper tackles the design of a fiscal union within a currency union using a simple
model. We show that a currency union creates macroeconomic externalities that call for
insurance arrangements among members to provide transfers to countries in the most
dire circumstances. Transfers help smooth consumption, the usual direct role of insur-
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ance, but this is not our focus. Instead, our first key observation is that under a fixed ex-
change rate, transfers also have an indirect effect: they promote spending and this helps
mitigate recessions (or, in the other direction, curb booms). The social benefits from in-
surance are greater than what is appreciated by private economic agents, since they do
not internalize these indirect macro stabilizing effects and only value the direct private
consumption smoothing role. Indeed, even under ideal, complete-market conditions the
equilibrium without intervention underinsures relative to the Pareto efficient level of in-
surance. A fiscal union can arrange for transfers among members to implement efficient
insurance, going beyond the complete market solution to provide greater insurance.
Fiscal unions may mean different things to different people, so let us clarify the scope
of our analysis at the outset. One perspective is that a fiscal union is needed to set rules for
the division of seignorage (e.g. Casella and Feinstein, 1988; Aizenman, 1992) or, relatedly,
that due to its budgetary effects, monetary and fiscal policy are inseparable (Sibert, 1992;
Sims, 1999; Bottazzi and Manasse, 2002). Another perspective focuses on the role that
the union’s central bank may play as the lender of last resort to both sovereigns (e.g.
De Grauwe, 2011) and banks (e.g. Goodhart, ed, 2000); the latter is sometimes referred to
as a banking union. We believe that all these perspectives are important. Our contribution
is to offer a different, more macroeconomic, perspective.
We focus on the fact that a common currency effectively fixes exchange rates and this
constrains monetary policy, limiting its potential to stabilize asymmetric shocks across
members. To single this effect out, we abstract from banks and sovereign financing issues.
Despite this, we find an important role for fiscal arrangements within a monetary union.
In this way our perspective is also closer to ideas from the original Optimal Currency
Area literature (for the pioneering articles, see Mundell, 1961; McKinnon, 1963; Kenen,
1969) and lends support to the view originally formulated by Kenen (1969) that fiscal
integration is an important condition for successful currency unions:
“It is a chief function of fiscal policy, using both sides of the budget, to offset
or compensate for regional differences, whether in earned income or in unem-
ployment rates. The large-scale transfer payments built into fiscal systems are
interregional, not just interpersonal [...]” (pg. 47)
Countries such as the United States, which can be thought as a currency and fiscal union
of regions, share federal revenue and transfers—through the unemployment insurance
program, federal income and social security taxes and, in extreme cases, direct federal
assistance—in a manner that provides automatic stabilizers across regions. Our results
also qualify a view often presented in the Optimal Currency Area literature that trans-
fers and risk sharing through private financial markets are substitutes—both providing
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adequate buffers against asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in a currency union. For ex-
ample, Mundell (1973) argues that a common currency could help improve risk sharing,
by increasing cross holdings of assets or deepening financial markets.1 While our model
is silent on whether a currency union may facilitate the development of private insurance,
it shows that the benefits of insurance are larger in a currency union and that government
intervention is needed to reap the full benefits. Indeed, we establish that private risk
sharing is not Pareto efficient in a currency union, so that financial integration alone is
not sufficient.
These ideas come across robustly in a variety of standard open economy models. We
begin our analysis with the simplest possible model: a static setting with a traded good,
a non-traded good and labor as in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). We then extend the anal-
ysis to a standard dynamic model featuring non-trivial intra-temporal trade and price
dynamics that builds on Galí and Monacelli (2005). The key friction in both settings is
price or wage stickiness. Countries form a currency union that constrains their monetary
policy response to asymmetric shocks. In this context, we set up the planning problem
for efficient insurance transfers among members.
Our main result is to show that there is a case for government intervention in these
macro insurance markets. This is the case even if agents are able to insure themselves in
complete asset markets. Under laissez-faire, private agents do not purchase the efficient
amount of insurance because they do not internalize the macroeconomic stabilization ef-
fects of their portfolio choices. Financial wealth affects spending, which in turn affects
output and hence income or wealth. This mechanism was first discussed in the famous
Transfer Problem debate involving Keynes (1929) and Ohlin (1929). We show that in the
presence of nominal price or wage rigidities, these macroeconomic effects are not inter-
nalized by individuals, resulting in market insurance, or lack thereof, that is inefficient
and tends to exacerbate booms and busts. This conclusion does not apply to countries
outside a currency union with flexible exchange rates, as long as they exercise their inde-
pendent monetary policy efficiently. Thus, our argument for government involvement in
macro insurance relies on membership in a currency union, which constrains monetary
policy, preventing stabilization in the face of asymmetric shocks. Fiscal and monetary
unions go hand in hand.
How can well-functioning financial markets lead to bad outcomes? Some economists
have proposed models where “pecuniary externalities” are to blame (e.g. Geanakop-
los and Polemarchakis, 1985; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2001; Bianchi and Mendoza,
2010; Jeanne and Korinek, 2010; Korinek, 2011; Bianchi, 2011). When markets are in-
1For a recent textbook treatment and discussion of many of these ideas see De Grauwe (2012).
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complete or when prices affect borrowing constraints, price-taking individuals will not
internalize the effect that their collective financial decisions have on current and future
prices, which, in turn, affect the financial possibilities of other individuals. Thus, in these
models inefficiencies arise from price fluctuations and their interaction with borrowing
constraints or incomplete markets. Note that the root of the inefficiency can be traced to
the financial market itself and that the argument has nothing to do with currency unions.
We propose a completely different mechanism, with inefficiencies arising from price in-
flexibility, instead of price variability. Moreover, the root of our inefficiency lies outside
the financial market. Indeed, our results hold even if we assume that financial markets
are complete and that borrowing constraints do not bind. The problem lies elsewhere, in
the market for goods or labor, which suffers from price or wage stickiness.
The inefficiency of market insurance can be addressed by government intervention.
Indeed efficient outcomes can be implemented in a number of ways. If individuals do
have access to private asset markets that are complete, then efficiency can be ensured
by providing tax incentives that distort their individual portfolios choices. We provide
a simple formula for the required tax system: the subsidy on the portfolio return in a
particular state of the world equals the product of the labor wedge (a measure of the
state of the business cycle) and the relative expenditure share of non-traded goods. A
second possibility is for the government can take over macro insurance by assuming the
necessary insurance positions in financial markets itself. Equivalently, instead of using
financial markets, it can arrange ex ante for state contingent transfers or “bailouts” with
other union members. In either case, it must then also take steps to ensure that the private
sector does not undo these arrangements, by setting up the aforementioned tax incentive
system or employing more extreme measures, such as banning private macro insurance.
We view the complete financial markets paradigm as a useful assumption to highlight
that the inefficiency of private insurance that we derive does not arise from inefficien-
cies in financial markets. However, our preferred interpretation is that financial markets
are incomplete, so that macro insurance markets are imperfect or nonexistent. This only
strengthens the argument for building a fiscal union that creates insurance arrangements
across members within a currency union. Indeed, the efficient insurance arrangement
can then be implemented through ex-post transfers or “bailouts” that are contingent on
the shocks experienced by each country. Since agents have no access to macro insurance,
no taxes or bans on private insurance are needed. Under this interpretation, our paper
can be seen as offering a precise characterization of these ex-post transfers and clarifying
that for members of a currency union: (i) the value of gaining access to insurance, for any
given level of insurance, is greater; and (ii) transfers go beyond emulating the outcome
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that private risk sharing would reach if only asset markets were complete. These two
points are distinct but complement each other to motivate the formation of fiscal unions
within currency unions.
In particular, we emphasize three key determinants of the effectiveness of transfers as
a stabilization tool in a currency union, which have received considerable attention in the
Optimal Currency Area Literature: the asymmetry of the shocks hitting the members of
the currency union, the persistence of these shocks (in the dynamic version of the model)
and the openness of the member economies. Indeed, symmetric shocks can be accommo-
dated with union wide monetary policy so that transfers should be used only in the face
asymmetric shocks. Efficient transfers are increasing in the persistence of the shocks, but
hump-shaped as a function of openness. However a given transfer is more effective at
stabilizing the economy when the economy is more closed. Hence more stabilization is
achieved at the optimum both when the economy is more closed, and when shocks are
more persistent.
Interestingly, although there is a role for government at the national level, we find no
need for coordination at the supranational level. The efficient risk sharing arrangement
is obtained when each country manages its own insurance in a competitive international
financial market—provided such markets are available, of course, otherwise, there is an
obvious need to convene to create these markets or recreate them by arranging for trans-
fers between members. Nevertheless, all these transactions or arrangements are mutually
beneficial and no concerted effort is required to control individual members’ insurance
goals. Overall, macro insurance is not a policy tool that requires international coordina-
tion to internalize spillovers across countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The static model is covered in Sections
2 and 3. The dynamic model is contained in Sections 4 and 5. Section 6 contains our
conclusions.
2 A Static Model of a Currency Union
We start with a simple static model that illustrates our main idea most transparently. Later
we show that the same effects are present in standard dynamic open economy models.
The model builds on the model with traded and non-traded goods presented in Obstfeld
and Rogoff (1995). It features a traded good, a non-traded good and labor. The traded
good is supplied inelastically and traded competitively. The non-traded good is supplied
from labor by monopolistic firms. The prices set by these monopolistic firms are sticky.
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2.1 Households
There is a single period and a continuum of countries indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. We start by
assuming that all countries belong to a currency union, but will relax this later. Uncer-
tainty affects preferences and technology: the state of the world s ∈ S has density pi(s)
and determines preferences and technology, possibly asymmetrically, in all countries.
In each country i ∈ I, there is a representative agent with preferences over non-traded
goods, traded goods and labor given by the expected utility
ˆ
Ui(CiNT(s), C
i
T(s), N
i(s); s)pi(s)ds.
Below we make some further assumptions on preferences. Agents can trade in a complete
set of financial markets before the realization of the state of the world s ∈ S. Households
are subject to the following budget constraints
ˆ
Di(s)Q(s)pi(s)ds ≤ 0,
PiNTC
i
NT(s) + PT(s)C
i
T(s) ≤W i(s)Ni(s) + PT(s)EiT(s) +Πi(s) + Ti(s) + (1+ τiD(s))Di(s),
where PiNT is the price of non-traded goods which as we will see shortly, does not
depend on s due to the assumed price stickiness; PT(s) is the price of traded goods in state
s; W i(s) is the nominal wage in state s; EiT(s) is country i’s endowment of traded goods
in state s; Πi(s) represents aggregate profits in state s; Ti(s) is a lump sum rebate; Di(s)
is the nominal payoff of the household portfolio in state s; Q(s) is the price of one unit of
currency in state s in world markets, normalized by the probability of state s; and τiD(s) is
a state contingent portfolio return subsidy.2 The lump sum rebate Ti(s) is used to rebate
the proceeds from the tax on financial transactions to households. We sometimes also
consider lump-sum transfers over and above such rebates to redistribute wealth across
countries. Note that the nominal price of traded goods is assumed to be the same across
countries, reflecting the law of one price and the fact that all countries in the union share
the same currency.
The households’ first order conditions can be written as
UiCT(s)(1+ τ
i
D(s))
Q(s)PT(s)
=
UiCT(s
′)(1+ τiD(s
′))
Q(s′)PT(s′)
, (1)
2Above we assumed that the returns from firms are not subsidized. Another possibility is to subsidize
profits Πi(s) at the same rate τiD(s) as financial returns. None of our analysis or conclusions are affected by
this modeling choice.
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UiCT(s)
PT(s)
=
UiCNT(s)
PiNT
, (2)
−U
i
N(s)
W i(s)
=
UiCNT(s)
PiNT
. (3)
2.2 Firms
We assume that the traded good is in inelastic supply: each country is endowed with a
quantity EiT(s) of traded goods. These goods are traded competitively in international
markets.
Non-traded goods are produced in each country by competitive firms that combine a
continuum of non-traded varieties indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] using the constant returns to scale
CES technology
YiNT(s) =
(ˆ 1
0
Yi,jNT(s)
1− 1ε dj
) 1
1− 1ε
,
with elasticity ε > 1.
Each variety is produced by a monopolist using a linear technology:
Yi,jNT(s) = A
i(s)Ni,j(s).
Each monopolist hires labor in a competitive market with wage W i(s), but pays W i(s)(1+
τiL) net of a country specific tax on labor. Monopolists must set prices in advance, at
the beginning of the period, before the realization of uncertainty. The demand for each
variety is given by CiNT(s)(P
i,j
NT/P
i
NT)
−ε where PiNT = (
´
(Pi,jNT)
1−εdj)1/(1−ε) is the price of
non traded goods. Thus, they solve
Πi,j(s) ≡ max
Pi,jNT
ˆ
Q(s)
1+ τiD(s)
(
Pi,jNT −
1+ τiL
Ai(s)
W i(s)
)
CiNT(s)
(
Pi,jNT
PiNT
)−ε
pi(s)ds,
and aggregate profits are given by Πi(s) =
´
Πi,j(s)dj. In a symmetric equilibrium, all
monopolists in country i set the same profit maximizing price. Rearranging the first-order
condition yields the familiar expression for the price as a markup over a weighted average
across states of the marginal cost
PiNT = (1+ τ
i
L)
ε
ε− 1
´ Q(s)
1+τiD(s)
Wi(s)
Ai(s) C
i
NT(s)pi(s)ds´ Q(s)
1+τiD(s)
CiNT(s)pi(s)ds
,
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or substituting out for prices and wages using the household’s first order conditions we
obtain the equilibrium condition
1+ τiL =
ε− 1
ε
´
UiCNT(s)C
i
NT(s)pi(s)ds
− ´ UiN(s)C
i
NT(s)
Ai(s) pi(s)ds
. (4)
2.3 Equilibrium Conditions
An equilibrium with taxes is defined in a standard way. Households choose their portfo-
lios, their consumption of traded and non traded goods, and their labor supply to maxi-
mize expected utility subject to their budget constraint taking taxes and prices as given;
implying the first order conditions (1)–(3). Firms set prices to maximize profits taking as
given the wage, taxes and aggregate demand CN; implying the first order condition (4).
Finally, we have the markets clearing conditions
CiNT(s) = A
i(s)Ni(s),ˆ
CiT(s)di =
ˆ
EiT(s)di.
We comment briefly on how one can think of the conditions for an equilibrium as
constraints in a planning problem. The constraints imposed by an equilibrium are simply
equations (1)–(4) and the two market clearing conditions shown above. Note, however,
that given quantities, equations (1), (3) and (4) can be used to back out taxes and wages:
the financial return subsidy, τiD(s), from (1), the wage relative to the price of non traded
goods, W
i(s)
PiNT
, from (3) and the tax on labor, τiL, from (4). Since taxes and wages do not enter
the welfare function, these three equations can be dropped from a planning problem.
The same cannot be said of condition (2), which characterizes the restriction imposed by
a currency union, namely, that the price of traded goods is equalized across countries.
Next, we characterize this key condition further by making some weak assumptions on
preferences.
2.4 Homothetic Preferences
We make two assumptions on preferences: (i) preferences over consumption goods are
weakly separable from labor; and (ii) the preference over consumption goods are homo-
thetic. Denoting by pi(s) = PT(s)
PiNT
the relative price of traded goods in state s in country i,
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these assumptions imply that
CiNT(s) = α
i(pi(s); s)CiT(s),
for some function αi(p; s) increasing and differentiable in p. This conveniently encap-
sulates the restriction implied by the first order condition (2). This condition is crucial
because the stickiness of non-traded prices, together with the lack of monetary indepen-
dence, places restrictions on the possible variability across i ∈ I, for any state of the world
s, in the relative price pi(s).
3 Efficient Macro Insurance in the Static Model
Define the indirect utility function
Vi(CT, p; s) ≡ Ui
(
αi(p; s)CT, CT,
αi(p; s)
Ai(s)
CT; s
)
.
In an equilibrium with CiT(s) and p
i(s), ex post welfare in state s in country i is then given
by
Vi(CiT(s), p
i(s); s).
The derivatives of the indirect utility function will prove useful for our analysis. To de-
scribe these derivatives, it is useful to first introduce the labor wedge3
τi(s) ≡ 1+ 1
Ai(s)
UiN (s)
UiCNT (s)
.
The labor wedge is zero at a first-best allocation.
Proposition 1. The derivatives of the value function are
Vip(C
i
T(s), p
i(s); s) =
αip(s)
pi(s)
CiT(s)U
i
CT(s) τ
i(s),
ViCT(C
i
T(s), p
i(s); s) = UiCT(s)
(
1+
αi(s)
pi(s)
τi(s)
)
.
These observations about the derivatives and their connection to the labor wedge will
be key to our results. A private agent values a transfer in traded goods according to
3In this and other expressions and functions we streamline the notation by leaving the dependence on
some of the arguments implicit.
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its marginal utility UiCT(s), but the actual marginal value in equilibrium is V
i
CT
(s). The
wedge between the two equals α
i(s)
pi(s)τ
i(s) = P
i
NTCNT(s)
PT(s)CT(s)
τi(s), the labor wedge weighted
by the relative expenditure share of non-traded goods relative to traded goods. We will
sometimes refer to it as the weighted labor wedge for short.
In particular, a private agent undervalues transfers ViCT(s) > U
i
CT
(s) whenever the
economy is experiencing a recession, in the sense of having a positive labor wedge τi(s) >
0. Conversely, private agents overvalue the costs of making transfers ViCT(s) < U
i
CT
(s)
whenever the economy is booming, in the sense of having a negative labor wedge τi(s) <
0. These effects are magnified when the relative expenditure share of non-traded goods
is large.
Note that it is theoretically possible for the marginal value of a transfer to be negative
ViCT(s) < 0 if the labor wedge is sufficiently negative, especially if the share of non traded
goods, relative to traded goods, is large enough. In this extreme case a country can im-
prove welfare by making gift transfers, without any counterpart transfer in the opposite
direction.
Corollary 1. If τi is sufficiently negative then unilateral gift transfers to other countries are
welfare enhancing for country i.
Although this extreme case will not be our focus and is not employed in any of our
results below, it is a stark example of just how divergent public and private valuations of
transfers can become.
When country i receives a transfer, its consumers feel richer and increase their spend-
ing on both traded and non-traded goods in equal proportions. Since prices are fixed, the
resulting increased demand for non-traded goods translates one-for-one into an increase
in output. This in turn generates more income, further raising spending etc. This mech-
anism is at the core of the famous Transfer Problem controversy between Keynes (1929)
and Ohlin (1929). These equilibrium effects, which are not internalized by private agents,
open up a wedge between the social and private marginal values of transfers.
Since the increase in demand for both goods is proportional, the “dollar-for-dollar”
output multiplier of transfers is precisely given by the relative expenditure share of non-
traded to traded goods P
i
NTC
i
NT(s)
PT(s)CiT(s)
. The labor wedge τi(s) summarizes the net calculation
for utility of the increase in non-traded consumption and the increase in labor that accom-
pany the increase in output. This explains why the wedge between the social and private
marginal valuations is precisely P
i
NTC
i
NT(s)
PT(s)CiT(s)
τi(s).
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3.1 Ramsey Planning Problem
We consider a planning problem that allows us to characterize constrained Pareto efficient
allocations.
Constrained Pareto efficient allocations. The planning problem is indexed by a set of
nonnegative Pareto weights λi. By varying these Pareto weights, we can trace out the
entire constrained Pareto frontier. The planning problem is
max
PT(s),PiNT ,C
i
T(s)
ˆ ˆ
Vi
(
CiT(s),
PT(s)
PiNT
; s
)
λipi(s) di ds (5)
subject to ˆ
CiT(s)di =
ˆ
EiT(s)di.
Let µ(s)pi(s) be the multiplier on the resource constraint in state s ∈ S. The first order
conditions for CiT(s), PT(s) and P
i
NT are, respectively,
ViCT(s)λ
i = µ(s),ˆ
Vip(s)
1
PiNT
λidi = 0,
ˆ
Vip(s)p
i(s)pi(s)ds = 0.
These first-order conditions tightly characterize the solution. The first order condition for
PiNT implies our first proposition.
Proposition 2 (Optimal Price Setting). At a constrained Pareto efficient equilibrium, for every
country i, a weighted average of labor wedges across states is zero:
ˆ
αip(s)C
i
T(s)U
i
CT(s) τ
i(s)pi(s) ds = 0.
In the absence of uncertainty this proposition implies a zero labor wedge τi(s) = 0,
obtained by setting the labor tax to cancel the monopolistic markup: τiL = −1/ε. With un-
certainty, in general τiL 6= −1/ε and the labor wedge takes on both signs with a weighted
average of zero.4
The first-order condition for PT(s) implies the following proposition.
4When the sub-utility function between CNT and CT is a CES so that α(·; s) has constant elasticity, inde-
pendent of s, then τiL = −1/ε is optimal even with uncertainty. The proof is contained in the appendix.
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Proposition 3 (Optimal Monetary Policy). At a constrained Pareto efficient equilibrium, in
every state s, a weighted average of labor wedges across countries is zero:
ˆ
αip(s)C
i
T(s)U
i
CT (s) τ
i(s)λidi = 0.
This proposition establishes that optimal monetary policy targets a weighted average
across countries for the labor wedge. It sets this target to zero in each state of the world.
The intuition for the result is that monetary policy can be chosen at the union level, and
can adapt across states to the average condition. If all countries are identical and the
shock is symmetric, then we obtain perfect stabilization in each country: τi(s) = 0 for all
i ∈ I, s ∈ S. By contrast, when shocks across countries are not symmetric then perfect
stabilization is impossible. However, at the union level the economy is stabilized in the
sense that the weighted average for the labor wedge across countries is set to zero for all
states of the world s ∈ S.5
Finally, the first order condition for CT(s) says that the marginal utility of transfers in
traded goods adjusted for the Pareto weight λiViCT(s) should be equalized across coun-
tries for every state s. It is more revealing to rewrite this condition using our expressions
for the derivative of ViCT(s).
Proposition 4 (Optimal Risk Sharing). For every pair of states (s, s′), and pair of countries
(i, i′), optimal risk sharing takes the following form:
UiCT(s)
(
1+ α
i(s)
pi(s)τ
i(s)
)
UiCT(s
′)
(
1+ α
i(s′)
pi(s′)τ
i(s′)
) = Ui
′
CT
(s)
(
1+ α
i′ (s)
pi′ (s)
τi
′
(s)
)
Ui′CT(s
′)
(
1+ α
i′ (s′)
pi′ (s′)
τi
′(s′)
) . (6)
If portfolio taxes are not employed, then the risk sharing condition (1) imposes the
additional constraint that for every pair of states (s, s′), and pair of countries (i, i′),
UiCT(s)
UiCT(s
′)
=
Ui
′
CT
(s)
Ui′CT(s
′)
. (7)
Comparing these conditions, one may expect the private risk sharing condition (7) to be
incompatible with the efficiency condition (6) except in special cases. Indeed, we next
5The result is related to the result in Galí and Monacelli (2008) that optimal monetary policy in a currency
union ensures that the union average output gap, in a linearized version of the model, is zero in every
period. Here the result is obtained without linearizing the model and it is expressed in terms of the labor
wedge, instead of the output gap.
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show that because labor wedges must average to zero across states and countries accord-
ing to Propositions 2 and 3, they are indeed incompatible unless the first best is attainable.
This implies that equilibria with privately optimal risk sharing (without portfolio taxes)
are constrained Pareto inefficient.
Proposition 5 (Inefficiency of Private Risk Sharing). An equilibrium without portfolio taxes
(τiD(s) = 0 for all i ∈ I, s ∈ S) is constrained Pareto inefficient unless τi(s) = 0 for all i ∈ I, s ∈
S, in which case it is first best.
Proof. Consider an equilibrium such that τi(s) 6= 0 for some i ∈ I, s ∈ S. Assume, towards
a contradiction, that the allocation is constrained Pareto efficient.
We consider two cases in turn. First, suppose that ViCT(s) = U
i
CT
(s)(1+ α
i(s)
pi(s)τ
i(s)) < 0
for some set Ω ⊂ I × S of positive measure of countries and states. Define the sections
Ω(s) = {i : (i, s) ∈ Ω}. Then there exists a perturbation that for each s ∈ S : (a) lowers
CiT(s) for i ∈ Ω(s) and improves welfare Vi(s); (b) increases CiT(s) for i /∈ Ω(s) and
improves welfare Vi(s); and (c) satisfies the resource constraint
´
CiT(s)di =
´
EiT(s)di.
This perturbation is feasible and creates a Pareto improvement, a contradiction.
Next, consider the case where 1 + α
i(s)
pi(s)τ
i(s) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I, s ∈ S. For each state s
consider ranking countries by their weighted labor wedge α
i(s)
pi(s)τ
i(s). By Proposition 4 it
must be that
1+ α
i(s)
pi(s)τ
i(s)
1+ α
i′ (s)
pi′ (s)
τi
′(s)
=
1+ α
i(s)
pi(s)τ
i(s′)
1+ α
i′ (s)
pi′ (s)
τi
′(s′)
for all i, i′, s and s′. This implies that the ranking must be the same in all states s. It
follows that there is a country i∗ that is at top of the ranking for all states s, i.e. i∗ ∈
∩s∈S arg maxi∈I α
i(s)
pi(s)τ
i(s). Proposition 3 then implies that this country has a positive labor
wedge: τi
∗
(s) ≥ 0 for all s. Proposition 2 then implies that τi∗(s) = 0 for all s. Therefore
we have that τi(s) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ I, s ∈ S. Proposition 3 then implies that actually
τi(s) = 0 for all i ∈ I, s ∈ S.
Under laissez-faire, private agents do not purchase the optimal amount of macro-
insurance. They do not fully internalize the macroeconomic stability consequences of
their portfolio decisions, opening a role for government intervention in macro-insurance
markets.6 Government intervention secures additional transfers from low weighted la-
bor wedge countries (“boom” countries) to high weighted labor wedge countries (“bust”
6We should also point out that the Propositions 3 and 4 go through if non-traded goods prices are entirely
predetermined (i.e. are exogenously fixed).
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countries). This reduces the demand for non-traded goods in the boom countries and in-
creases it in the bust countries, stabilizing output and income. These stabilization benefits
are not internalized by private agents, hence the need for government intervention.
3.2 Countries outside the currency union
Up to this point we have assumed that all countries belong to the currency union. Now,
imagine that only a subset of countries I ⊆ [0, 1] are members. The rest manage monetary
policy independently as follows. Country i /∈ I sets its own local nominal price for the
traded good PiT(s) = E
i(s)PT(s) in its home currency by manipulating the level of its
exchange rate Ei(s) against the union’s currency. The planning problem becomes
max
ˆ
i∈I
Vi
(
CiT(s),
PT(s)
PiNT
; s
)
λidi +
ˆ
i/∈I
Vi
(
CiT(s),
PiT(s)
PiNT
; s
)
λidi (8)
subject to ˆ
CiT(s)di =
ˆ
EiT(s)di.
For a country i /∈ I outside the union, the first order condition for PiT(s) is
Vip(C
i
T(s), p
i(s); s) =
αip(s)
pi(s)
CiT(s)U
i
CT(s) τ
i(s) = 0.
By implication
τi(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S, i /∈ I.
A flexible exchange rate leads to perfect stabilization, in the sense that the labor wedge is
set to zero for all states of the world. This result is reminiscent of the arguments set forth
by Friedman (1953) and Mundell (1961) in favor of flexible exchange rates. For countries
in the currency union optimal monetary policy is still imperfect and characterized by the
average condition for the labor wedge in Proposition 3.
The optimal risk sharing condition in Proposition 4 still applies to all countries, inside
or outside the currency union. However, since τi(s) = 0 for s ∈ S, i /∈ I, this condi-
tion coincides with the privately optimal risk sharing condition for countries outside the
currency union. As a result, there is no need to upset private risk sharing.
Proposition 6 (Countries Outside the Currency Union). None of the results are affected by
considering countries outside the union. Countries that have independent monetary policy manage
to obtain a zero labor wedge τi(s) = 0 and should not subsidize macro insurance τiD(s) = 0.
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If private markets are nonexistent, an alternative interpretation for Proposition 6 is
that for countries outside the union ex-post government transfers should be arranged to
imitate private risk sharing, no portfolio taxes are needed.
How are attitudes towards risk affected by membership in a union? We show that
members are more risk averse in the following sense. Suppose country i belongs to the
currency union with equilibrium relative price pi(s). The advantage of leaving the union
is that the relative price pi is not constrained and welfare attains the first best level condi-
tional on CiT. It follows that
vi(CiT; s) ≡ Vi(CiT, pi(s); s) ≤ maxp V
i(CiT, p; s) ≡ Vi∗(CiT; s), (9)
with equality if and only if pi(s) ∈ arg maxp Vi(CiT, p; s), in which case the labor wedge
is zero, τ(s) = 0. Thus, for every state s, the function Vi∗ is the upper envelope over vi
and is tangent to it precisely at a level of CiT that implies τ(s) = 0. In this sense, v
i is more
concave than Vi∗ and member countries are more risk averse. We shall put this inequality
to use in the next section.
3.3 Value of Insurance
Our simple model allows for three random disturbances: (i) shocks to productivity of
labor in the production of non-traded goods; (ii) shocks to preferences (demand); and (iii)
shocks to the endowment of traded goods. Proposition 5 shows that if the equilibrium
without portfolio taxes does not attain the first best, then it is constrained inefficient.
As we show next, this is true except in a knife-edge cases. Examining these knife-edge
cases turns out to be interesting, because even when the equilibria coincides with the
first best we find that the planner values the availability of insurance strictly more than
private agents do. Macro insurance is of greater public value than the aggregate private
valuation. Extrapolating beyond our model, this could help explain why macro insurance
markets may be missing, even if their social value is significant.
To concoct an example where the first best is attainable it is useful to specialized our
model to the utility function
Ui(CT, CNT, N; s) = log(CT) + αi(s) log(CNT)− 11+ φN
1+φ, (10)
with φ ≥ 0.
Proposition 7. Suppose the utility function is given by (10), then the equilibrium without port-
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folio taxes is constrained efficient if and only if productivity shocks and preference shocks are such
for all pairs of countries (i, i′),
Ai(s)
Ai′(s)
(
αi(s)
αi
′(s)
) −φ
1+φ
is constant for all s ∈ S; the shocks to the endowment of traded goods Ei(s) can be arbitrary.
This proposition defines a precise notion of symmetric shocks to productivity and
preferences for which the first best allocation is attainable without portfolio taxes. For
example, if the only shocks are to productivity, then this condition requires that produc-
tivity vary proportionally across countries. A currency union can handle such a shock
using union-wide monetary policy. A similar point applies to taste shocks. More gen-
erally, the key constraint imposed by nominal rigidities and a single monetary policy is
condition (2), rewritten here for convenience as
UiCNT(s)
UiCT(s)
=
PiNT
PT(s)
where PT(s) is only allowed to vary with s not i, while PiNT is allowed to vary with i but
not s. In other words, one can handle fixed differences across countries and union-wide
shocks to this marginal rate of substitution, but not individual variations. This refines
the notion of symmetric shocks that is required for the first best. Monetary policy in
a currency union is constrained, affecting the adjustment in prices, but in some special
circumstances no adjustment is needed.
This discussion highlights just how special these circumstances are. Note, however,
that the proposition implies that endowment shocks can be properly insured without
portfolio taxes. To understand this result, suppose we only have shocks to endowments.
Then the first best features perfect risk sharing in the consumption of traded goods: only
aggregate fluctuations in traded goods affect the consumption of traded goods. Due to
separability of preferences, the first best allocation for non traded goods and labor is not
affected by these shocks. It follows that the marginal rate of substitution only varies with
union-wide shocks and the first best is implementable as an equilibrium. The marginal
rate of substitution only varies with union-wide shocks—and does so symmetrically—
implying that the first best is implementable as an equilibrium.7
7In more detail, suppose Ai(s) = Ai and αi(s) = αi. The first best allocation features CiT(s) =
1
λi
´ 1
0 E
i(s)di, Ni(s) =
(
αi
) 1
1+φ , and CiNT(s) = A
i (αi) 11+φ . This allocation is supported as an equilibrium
without portfolio taxes by PiNT =
(
αi
) φ
1+φ /(λi Ai), PT(s) = (
´ 1
0 E
i(s)di)−1, Wi(s) =
(
αi
) φ
1+φ /λi, Q(s) = 1
and 1+ τiL =
ε−1
ε .
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Figure 1: Welfare as perceived by individual agents (upper green curve) and country as a
whole (lower blue curve).
Of course, the case of endowment shocks is somewhat artificial, relying on the model-
ing asymmetry that non traded goods are produced but traded goods are not. If instead
traded goods were produced from labor and another fixed input (capital or land) subject
to (industry specific) productivity shocks, then these shocks would also have to satisfy the
restriction of being symmetric to attain the first best—just as in the case of productivity
shocks in the non traded goods.
It is useful to have a case, however artificial, where private insurance is efficient so
that we can isolate a separate result. We show that members of a currency union value
this insurance more than non members. Moreover, this is is not the true of the value
placed on insurance by private individuals. This highlights the role of the macroeconomic
externality from insurance, which is not internalized by private agents.
Proposition 8. Suppose there are only endowment shocks and that all risk is idiosyncratic, so that
the aggregate endowment is constant across states:
i. If we exclude a country from insurance markets, then its utility loss is greater if it belongs
to a currency union.
ii. If we excluded a single individual within a country from insurance markets, then his utility
loss is the same whether or not his country belongs to a currency union.
Figure 1 illustrates the basic logic behind the first part this proposition for an exam-
ple with two the equiprobable endowment values. Since the aggregate endowment is
constant, the price of traded goods is constant and perfect financial markets offer fair
insurance. The resulting equilibrium features constant consumption of the traded good
at the average value of the endowment and constant prices and wages. This is true for
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both members and non members. When the country is excluded from insurance its con-
sumption of the traded good must now fluctuate with its endowment, creating a mean-
preserving spread in consumption of traded goods and a loss in expected utility. The
crucial point is that the loss is greater for union members because they are more risk
averse, according to inequality (9). Indeed, given that prices are constant and the utility
function is independent of the state s this inequality simplifies to
Vi(CiT, p¯) ≤ maxp V
i(CiT, p) ≡ Vi∗(CiT).
These two value functions are depicted in the figure. They are tangent at the average
value of the endowment E¯ because this represents the equilibrium consumption level
with insurance.
As to the second part of the proposition, it follows easily from the observation that
the equilibrium with insurance is the same whether or not the country belongs to the cur-
rency union. In both cases the first best allocation is attained. Therefore, if an individual
is excluded from insurance markets he faces the same prices whether the country is a
member or not. Thus, the drop in utility is the same.
3.4 Implementation
Constrained Pareto efficient equilibria can be decentralized with appropriate labor taxes
τiL and corrective portfolio taxes τ
i
D(s). Proposition 4 leads to a neat characterization of
the required taxes.
Proposition 9 (Implementation). Constrained Pareto efficient allocations can be implemented
by subsidized private insurance with the portfolio return subsidy rates given by the formula
τiD(s) =
αi(s)
pi(s)
τi(s).
Insurance for bad states of the world, where the weighted labor wedge is high, should
be relatively subsidized. It is interesting to note that the taxes do not depend on the Pareto
weights {λi}. This underscores the fact that they are imposed to correct a macroeconomic
externality and not to redistribute.
The implementation of the socially optimum with corrective portfolio taxes is only one
interesting possibility. Another equally interesting interpretation of our results is possible
if one assumes that private asset markets are nonexistent, so that private opportunities
for risk sharing are unavailable. The optimum can then be implemented through ex-
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post transfers contingent on the shocks experienced by each country—no restriction on
private portfolios are needed since no assets are available to private agents. Our results
can then be seen as offering a precise characterization of the required ex-post transfers,
and showing that these transfers would go beyond replicating the outcome that private
risk sharing decisions would achieve if markets were complete.
It is also possible to imagine implementations that are in between the two polar cases
of corrective portfolio taxes with complete markets and ex-post transfers with incomplete
markets. In general, government positions in asset markets, or ex-post transfers contin-
gent on the shocks experienced by each country, combined with some restrictions or tax
incentives on agents private portfolios are required.
3.5 Coordination
Our next results establishes that we can let governments pick the tax rates on their house-
holds’ portfolios in isolation, with no need for coordination at the supranational level.
The corrective portfolio taxes allow each country’s government to control the country’s
portfolio Di(s), subject to the country budget constraint
ˆ
Di(s)Q(s)pi(s)ds ≤ 0,
where the government takes the price Q(s) of insurance in state s as given.
Proposition 10 (No Need for Coordination). Constrained Pareto efficient allocations can be
achieved by each country’s government arranging insurance payments acting as a price taker in a
competitive international insurance market. No coordination is required.
3.6 Nominal Wage Rigidity
We now show that all our results go through, with minimal changes, if wages are nomi-
nally rigid instead of prices. It should be clear that we could also manage a situation that
combines wage and price rigidity.
In order to have a well defined wage setting problem we assume that labor services are
produced by combining a variety of differentiated labor inputs according to the constant
returns CES technology
Ni(s) =
(ˆ 1
0
Ni,h(s)1−
1
εw dh
) 1
1− 1εw
.
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The rest of the technology is as before. We assume that in each country there is a contin-
uum of workers h ∈ [0, 1], each supplying a particular variety h ∈ [0, 1] with preferences
ˆ
Ui(Ci,hNT(s), C
i,h
T (s), N
i,h(s); s)pi(s)ds.
The budget constraints are the same as before
ˆ
Di,h(s)Q(s)pi(s)ds ≤ 0,
PiNT(s)C
i,h
NT(s) + PT(s)C
i,h
T (s) ≤ (1− τiL)W i,hNi,h(s)
+ PT(s)EiT(s) +Π
i(s) + Ti(s) + (1+ τiD(s))D
i,h(s),
except that the wage W i,h is now specific to each worker h but independent of s because
wages are set in advance of the realization of the state s. Note that prices of non-traded
goods are now state contingent. For convenience, we now assume that the worker pays
for the labor tax; firms are untaxed.
Workers set their own wages W i,h taking into account that in each state of the world s
labor demand is given by Ni(s)(W i,h/W i)−εw where W i = (
´
(W i,h)1−εw dh)1/(1−εw) is the
wage index for labor services. In a symmetric equilibrium, all workers set the same wage
W i,h = W i, and consume and work the same so that Ci,hNT(s) = C
i
NT(s), C
i,h
T (s) = C
i
T(s)
and Ni,h(s) = Ni(s). The wage W i is given by
W i =
1
1− τiL
ew
ew − 1
´ −Ni(s)UiN(s)pi(s)ds´ UiCNT (s)
PiNT(s)
Ni(s)pi(s)ds
.
All varieties sell at the same price so that Pi,jNT(s) = P
i
NT(s). This price is given by
PiNT(s) =
e
e− 1
W i
Ai(s)
.
All the results that we derived in the version of the model with sticky prices carry
through with no modification to this specification with sticky wages. In particular, Propo-
sitions 2–10 are still valid.
20
4 A Dynamic Model
The static model reveals some key results in a simple and transparent manner. However,
it is perhaps too simple to explore the issues in greater depth. We now build a richer,
dynamic model similar to Farhi and Werning (2012) which in turn builds on Galí and
Monacelli (2005, 2008). We present the model with incomplete markets where agents can
only trade short-term risk free bonds as in Farhi and Werning (2012), although we will
also compare it to the complete financial market case when we turn to the log-linearized
version of the model in Section 5.
In Farhi and Werning (2012), we focused on capital controls. Here instead we do no
consider capital controls. Instead, our focus, just as in the static model, is on the design of
ex-post transfers between countries that are contingent on the shocks experienced by all
countries.
We focus on one-time shocks, starting in a symmetric steady state. At t = 0, the path
for productivity in each country is realized. There is no further uncertainty. In the log-
linearized version of the model, which we focus our analysis on, it is well known that a
certainty equivalence principle holds so that this assumption is irrelevant. In other words,
our analysis can simply be understood as an impulse response characterization in a setup
where shocks might keep occurring in every period.
4.1 Households
There is a continuum measure one of countries i ∈ [0, 1]. We focus attention on a single
country, which we call Home, and can be thought of as a particular value H ∈ [0, 1]. In
every country, there is a representative household with preferences represented by the
utility function
∞
∑
t=0
βt
[
C1−σt
1− σ −
N1+φt
1+ φ
]
, (11)
where Nt is labor, and Ct is a consumption index defined by
Ct =
[
(1− α) 1η C
η−1
η
H,t + α
1
η C
η−1
η
F,t
] η
η−1
,
where CH,t is an index of consumption of domestic goods given by
CH,t =
(ˆ 1
0
CH,t(j)
e−1
e dj
) e
e−1
,
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where j ∈ [0, 1] denotes an individual good variety. Similarly, CF,t is a consumption index
of imported goods given by
CF,t =
(ˆ 1
0
C
γ−1
γ
i,t di
) γ
γ−1
,
where Ci,t is, in turn, an index of the consumption of varieties of goods imported from
country i, given by
Ci,t =
(ˆ 1
0
Ci,t(j)
e−1
e dj
) e
e−1
.
Thus, e is the elasticity between varieties produced within a given country, η the elas-
ticity between domestic and foreign goods, and γ the elasticity between goods produced
in different foreign countries. An important special case obtains when σ = η = γ = 1.
We call this the Cole-Obstfeld case, in reference to Cole and Obstfeld (1991). This case is
more tractable and has some special implications that are worth highlighting. Thus, we
devote special attention to it, although we will also derive results away from it.
The parameter α indexes the degree of home bias, and can be interpreted as a measure
of openness. Consider both extremes: as α → 0 the share of foreign goods vanishes; as
α → 1 the share of home goods vanishes. Since the country is infinitesimal, the latter
captures a very open economy without home bias; the former a closed economy barely
trading with the outside world.
Households seek to maximize their utility subject to the sequence of budget con-
straints
ˆ 1
0
PH,t(j)CH,t(j)dj +
ˆ 1
0
ˆ 1
0
Pi,t(j)Ci,t(j)djdi + Dt+1 +
ˆ 1
0
Ei,tDit+1di
≤WtNt +Πt + Tt + (1+ it−1)Dt +
ˆ 1
0
Ei,t(1+ iit−1)D
i
tdi
for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . In this inequality, PH,t(j) is the price of domestic variety j, Pi,t is the
price of variety j imported from country i, Wt is the nominal wage, Πt represents nom-
inal profits and Tt is a nominal lump sum transfer. All these variables are expressed in
domestic currency. The portfolio of home agents is composed of home and foreign bond
holding: Dt is home bond holdings of home agents, Dit is bond holdings of country i of
home agents. The returns on these bonds are determined by the nominal interest rate
in the home country it, the nominal interest rate iit in country i, and the evolution of the
nominal exchange rate Ei,t between home and country i.
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The nominal lump sum transfer is the focus of our analysis. More precisely, we al-
low for ex-post transfers across countries, contingent on the shocks experienced by these
countries. We will provide a sharp characterization of these optimal transfers in the log-
linearized version of the model. We will also compare these transfers to the implicit trans-
fers that would occur through financial markets if asset markets were complete and pri-
vate agents freely chose their portfolios.
4.2 Firms
Technology. A typical firm in the home economy produces a differentiated good with a
linear technology given by
Yt(j) = AH,tNt(j) (12)
where AH,t is productivity in the home country. We denote productivity in country i by
Ai,t.
We allow for a constant employment tax 1+ τL, so that real marginal cost deflated by
Home PPI is given by
MCt =
1+ τL
AH,t
Wt
PH,t
.
We take this employment tax to be constant in our model. We pin this tax rate down by
assuming that it is optimally set cooperatively at a symmetric steady state with flexible
prices. The tax rate is simply set to offset the monopoly distortion so that τL = −1ε .
Price-setting assumptions. As in Galí and Monacelli (2005), we maintain the assump-
tion that the Law of One Price (LOP) holds so that at all times, the price of a given variety
in different countries is identical once expressed in the same currency. This assumption
is known as Producer Currency Pricing (PCP) and is sometimes contrasted with the as-
sumption of Local Currency Pricing (LCP), where each variety’s price is set separately for
each country and quoted (and potentially sticky) in that country’s local currency. Thus,
LOP does not necessarily hold. It has been shown by Devereux and Engel (2003) that
LCP and PCP may have different implications for monetary policy. However, for our
purposes, these two polar cases are equivalent since, for the most part, we will study the
model assuming fixed exchange rates.
We consider Calvo price setting, where in every period, a randomly selected fraction
1− δ of firms can reset their prices. Those firms that get to reset their price choose a reset
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price Prt to solve
max
Prt
∞
∑
k=0
δk
(
k
∏
h=1
1
1+ it+h
)
(Prt Yt+k|t − PH,tMCtYt+k|t)
where Yt+k|t =
(
Prt
PH,t+k
)−e
Ct+k, taking the sequences for MCt, Yt and PH,t as given.
4.3 Terms of Trade, Exchange Rates and UIP
It is useful to define the following price indices: home’s Consumer Price Index (CPI) Pt =
[(1− α)P1−ηH,t + αP1−ηF,t ]
1
1−η , home’s Producer Price Index (PPI) PH,t = [
´ 1
0 PH,t(j)
1−edj]
1
1−e ,
and the index for imported goods PF,t = [
´ 1
0 P
1−γ
i,t di]
1
1−γ , where Pi,t = [
´ 1
0 Pi,t(j)
1−edj]
1
1−e
is country i’s PPI.
Let Ei,t be nominal exchange rate between home and i (an increase in Ei,t is a de-
preciation of the home currency). Because the Law of One Price holds, we can write
Pi,t(j) = Ei,tPii,t(j) where P
i
i,t(j) is country i’s price of variety j expressed in its own cur-
rency. Similarly, Pi,t = Ei,tPii,t where P
i
i,t = [
´ 1
0 P
i
i,t(j)
1−e]
1
1−e is country i’s domestic PPI in
terms of country i’s own currency. We therefore have
PF,t = EtP∗t
where P∗t = [
´ 1
0 P
i1−γ
i,t di]
1
1−γ is the world price index and Et is the effective nominal ex-
change rate.8
The effective terms of trade are defined by
St =
PF,t
PH,t
=
(ˆ 1
0
S1−γi,t di
) 1
1−γ
where Si,t = Pi,t/PH,t is the terms of trade of home versus i. The terms of trade can be
used to rewrite the home CPI as
Pt = PH,t[1− α+ αS1−ηt ]
1
1−η .
Finally we can define the real exchange rate between home and i as Qi,t = Ei,tPit /Pt.
8The effective nominal exchange rate is defined as Et = [
´ 1
0 E
1−γ
i,t P
i1−γ
i,t di]
1
1−γ /[
´ 1
0 P
i1−γ
i,t di]
1
1−γ .
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We define the effective real exchange rate be
Qt = EtP
∗
t
Pt
.
4.4 Equilibrium Conditions
We now summarize the equilibrium conditions. Equilibrium in the home country can be
described by the following equations. We find it convenient to group these equations into
two blocks, which we refer to as the demand block and the supply block.
The demand block is independent of the nature of price setting. It is composed of the
Backus-Smith condition
Ct = ΘiCitQ
1
σ
i,t, (13)
where Θi is a relative Pareto weight which depends on the realization of the shocks, the
goods market clearing condition
Yt =
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η [
(1− α)Ct + α
ˆ 1
0
Cit(S
i
tSi,t)
γ−ηQηi,tdi
]
, (14)
were Sit is denotes the effective terms of trade of country i, the labor market clearing
condition
Nt =
Yt
AH,t
∆t (15)
where ∆t is an index of price dispersion ∆t =
´ 1
0
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−e
, the Euler equation
1+ it = β−1
Cσt+1
Cσt
Πt+1
whereΠt =
Pt+1
Pt is CPI inflation, the arbitrage condition between home and foreign bonds
1+ it = (1+ iit)
Ei,t+1
Ei,t
, (16)
for all i ∈ [0, 1], and the country budget constraint
NFAt = − (PH,tYt − PtCt) + 11+ it NFAt+1 (17)
where NFAt is the country’s net foreign assets at t, which for convenience, we measure in
home numeraire. We also impose a No-Ponzi condition so that we can write the budget
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constraint in present-value form
NFA0 = −
∞
∑
t=0
(
t−1
∏
s=0
1
1+ is
)
(PH,tYt − PtCt) . (18)
The value of NFA0, which depends on the realization of shocks, is a measure of the (net
present value) transfer to the home country. Characterizing the optimal value of NFA0
depending on the shocks is of the main focuses of our analysis below. Absent ex-post
transfers across countries, we would have NFA0 = 0 since countries are ex-ante identical
and only risk-free bonds can be traded. We will also compare the optimal value of NFA0
to the value that would obtain if private agents could engage in risk-sharing through a
complete set of financial markets. One of our main results will establish that these values
differ, and to characterize how they differ.
Finally with Calvo price setting, the supply block is composed of the equations sum-
marizing the first-order condition for optimal price setting. These conditions are provided
in Appendix A.2. We will only analyze a log-linearized version of the model with Calvo
price setting (see Section 5).
For most of the paper, we will be concerned with fixed exchange rate regimes (either
pegs or currency unions) in which case we have the additional restriction that Et = E0 for
all t ≥ 0 where E0 is predetermined.
5 Efficient Transfers in the Dynamic Model
As is standard in the literature, we work with a log-linearized approximation of the
model. As before, at t = 0, the economy is hit with an unanticipated shock. It is con-
venient to work with a continuous time version of the model. This does not affect our
results, but it is useful because it implies that no price index can jump at t = 0 and this
simplifies the derivation of initial conditions characterizing the equilibrium. We denote
the instantaneous discount rate by ρ, and the instantaneous arrival rate for price changes
by ρδ.
From now on we focus on the Cole-Obstfeld case σ = η = γ = 1. This case is attractive
for two reasons. First, with flexible prices, it is not optimal to use insurance or transfers
since perfect risk sharing is achieved through movements in the real exchange rate and
trade remains balanced. Second, even when prices are sticky, the laissez-faire equilibrium
with incomplete markets coincides with its complete markets counterpart. Once again,
risk sharing is delivered with balanced trade. This means that we can interpret any devi-
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ation from balanced trade at the optimum with transfers as an indication that private risk
sharing through complete financial markets (if those were available) would be subopti-
mal. Third, it is possible to derive a simple second-order approximation of the welfare
function around the symmetric deterministic steady state. Away from the Cole-Obstfeld
case the welfare function is more involved.
We start by considering the case where all countries are members of the same currency
union. Later, we consider the case where some countries are in a currency union, while
others retain outside, with a flexible exchange rate and independent monetary policy. We
show transfers are nonzero only for countries within a currency union.
The natural allocation. We define a reference allocation which corresponds to the flex-
ible price allocation, with no transfers across countries over and above the privately op-
timal transfers (the complete markets solution). Note that we impose flexible prices in
every country. We describe this allocation in log deviations from the symmetric steady
state with a lower case, and a double bar. We denote with a star the union average of
a given variable. For example, ¯¯y∗t =
´ 1
0
¯¯yitdi and ¯¯c
∗
t =
´ 1
0
¯¯citdi. At the natural allocation,
output in country i is given by
¯¯yit = ai,t,
consumption is given by
¯¯cit = α
ˆ 1
0
ai,tdi + (1− α)ai,t,
labor is given by
¯¯nit = 0,
and the terms of trade are given by
¯¯sti = ai,t −
ˆ 1
0
ai,tdi.
In addition, trade is balanced.
Finally, aggregate output is equal to aggregate consumption and is given by
¯¯y∗t = ¯¯c∗t =
ˆ 1
0
ai,tdi.
Note that by construction
´ 1
0
¯¯sitdi = 0.
9
9Although we do not need it for our analysis, note that the natural interest rate is given by ¯¯rit = a˙i,t.
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Summarizing the system in gaps. We denote by ˆˆyit and
ˆˆθi the deviations of yit and θ
i
from their flexible price counterparts. We denote by y˜it = ˆˆy
i
t − ˆˆy∗t and θ˜i = ˆˆθi − ˆˆθ∗ where
ˆˆy∗t =
´ 1
0
ˆˆyitdi and
ˆˆθ∗ =
´ 1
0
ˆˆθidi = 0 the deviations of these variables from their correspond-
ing aggregates; also let p˜iiH,t = pi
i
H,t − pi∗t where pi∗t =
´ 1
0 pi
i
H,tdi. Note that
ˆˆθi is already a
normalized variable so that ˆˆθi = θ˜i.
The trade balance is constant and equals −αθ˜i. The net foreign asset position must
pay for the present value of the trade deficits, so that starting from a position of zero net
foreign assets, transfers must bring the net foreign asset position to
˜NFAi0 =
α
ρ
θ˜i.
The disaggregated variables solve the ordinary differential equations, corresponding
to the Phillips curve and the Euler equation,
˙˜piiH,t = ρp˜i
i
H,t − κˆy˜it − λαθ˜i,
˙˜yit = −p˜iiH,t − ˙¯¯sit,
with initial condition
y˜i0 = (1− α)θ˜i − ¯¯si0,
where λ = ρδ(ρ+ ρδ) and κˆ = λ(1+ φ) index price flexibility.
Since
´ 1
0
¯¯sitdi = 0, as long as
´ 1
0 θ˜
idi = 0 the following aggregation constraints are
verified for any bounded solution of the system above:
ˆ 1
0
y˜itdi = 0,
ˆ 1
0
p˜iiH,tdi = 0.
We will assume that the zero lower bound on the nominal interest is not binding. Then the
only constraint on the aggregates is that they must satisfy the aggregate New Keynesian
Philips Curve
p˙i∗t = ρpi∗t − κˆ ˆˆy∗t .
Thus, there are many possible paths for the aggregate variables, depending on the stance
of monetary policy at the union level.
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From these equations we can infer aggregate consumption
ˆˆc∗t = ˆˆy∗t .
We can also infer the disaggregated variables for country i as follows. The terms of trade
gap s˜it can be backed out from
y˜it = (1− α)θ˜i + s˜it.
which combines the market clearing condition with the Backus-Smith condition. Simi-
larly, we can back out the employment gap n˜it and the consumption gap c˜
i
t from technol-
ogy and market clearing
y˜it = n˜
i
t,
y˜it = c˜
i
t + αs˜
i
t − αθ˜i.
Loss function. We are interested in the symmetric constrained Pareto efficient alloca-
tion that provides optimal ex-ante insurance behind the veil of ignorance, before shocks
are realized. To solve for this we maximize an unweighted Utilitarian welfare function.
A simple representation of the loss function associated with this welfare criterion is as
follows (see Farhi and Werning, 2012):
1
2
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ 1
0
e−ρt
[
αpi(p˜i
i
H,t + pi
∗
t )
2 + (y˜it + ˆˆy
∗
t )
2 + (1− α)αθ(θ˜i)2
]
di dt,
where αpi = eλ(1+φ) and αθ =
α
1+φ
(2−α
1−α + 1− α
)
.10 The first two terms in the loss function
are familiar in New-Keynesian models and are identical to those obtained by Galí and
Monacelli (2005, 2008). The third term captures the direct welfare effects of transfers—it
penalizes deviations from efficient private risk sharing. In the closed economy limit, as
α→ 0, this term goes to zero since αθ → 0.
Note that from the perspective of an individual country i, transfers also have a first
order effect on welfare—the loss function of an individual country inherits a term
−1
2
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt 2α(2−α)1+φ θ˜
idt,
This term represents the pure distributional aspect of transfers. These distributional con-
cerns are zero sum and wash out in the aggregate since
´ 1
0 θ˜
i = 0.
10This welfare function assumes that labor taxes are set to maximize total welfare at the symmetric deter-
ministic steady state.
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5.1 Laissez-Faire with Incomplete Markets in a Currency Union
Before analyzing the optimal solution, we first analyze the laissez faire solution. Using
the fact that
´ 1
0 y˜
i
tdi =
´ 1
0 p˜i
i
H,tdi = 0, we are led to the following planning problem:
min
1
2
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ 1
0
e−ρt
[
αpi(p˜i
i
H,t)
2 + (y˜it)
2 + αpi(pi
∗
t )
2 + ( ˆˆy∗t )2
]
di dt
subject to
˙˜piiH,t = ρp˜i
i
H,t − κˆy˜it,
˙˜yit = −p˜iiH,t − ˙¯¯sit,
y˜i0 = − ¯¯si0,
p˙i∗t = ρpi∗t − κˆ ˆˆy∗t ,
where the minimization is over the variables p˜iiH,t, pi
∗
t , y˜
i
t, ˆˆy
∗
t . Note that since θ˜
i = 0, the
two aggregation constraints
´ 1
0 y˜
i
tdi = 0 and
´ 1
0 p˜i
i
H,tdi = 0 are automatically verified.
The solution of the planning problem is then simply ˆˆy∗t = pi∗t = 0 for the aggregates.
This result is a restatement of the result in Galí and Monacelli (2008) that optimal mone-
tary policy in a currency union ensures that the union average output gap and inflation
are zero in every period.11 Monetary policy can be chosen at the union level so that mone-
tary conditions are adapted to the average country. The disaggregated variables p˜iiH,t and
y˜it solve the following system of differential equations,
˙˜piiH,t = ρp˜i
i
H,t − κˆy˜it,
˙˜yit = −p˜iiH,t − ˙¯¯sit,
with initial condition
y˜i0 = − ¯¯si0.
Proposition 11 (Laissez-Faire). The laissez-faire solution with incomplete markets ( ˜NFAi0 =
θ˜i = 0) coincides with its complete markets counterpart. Moreover, union-wide aggregates are
zero
ˆˆy∗t = pi∗t = 0.
A property of the Cole-Obstfeld case is that the laissez-faire solution with complete
11Galí and Monacelli (2008) established this result under laissez-faire with complete markets in the Cole-
Obstfeld case. As is well known, complete and incomplete markets coincide in this case. Hence their results
can be seen as characterizing the laissez-faire solution that we analyze here.
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markets coincides with the incomplete markets solution where no-state contingent assets
are available. Indeed, it coincides with complete financial autarky. The lack of complete
markets is not a constraint on private risk sharing.
5.2 Transfer Multipliers in a Currency Union
Before solving the normative problem it is useful to review the positive effects of transfers.
The next proposition characterizes the response of the economy to a marginal increase in
transfers.
Proposition 12 (Transfer Multipliers). Let ν = ρ−
√
ρ2+4κˆ
2 . Transfer multipliers are given by
∂y˜it
∂ ˜NFAi0
= eνtρ
1− α
α
− (1− eνt)ρ 1
1+ φ
,
∂p˜iiH,t
∂ ˜NFAi0
= −νeνt
[
ρ
1− α
α
+ ρ
1
1+ φ
]
,
∂s˜it
∂ ˜NFAi0
= −[1− eνt]
[
ρ
1− α
α
+ ρ
1
1+ φ
]
.
The presence of the discount factor ρ in all these expressions is natural because what
matters is the annuity value ρ ˜NFAi0 of the transfer. Note that the terms of trade gap equals
accumulated inflation: s˜t = −
´ t
0 p˜i
i
H,sds.
Transfers have opposite effects on output in the short and long run. In the short run,
when prices are rigid, there is a Keynesian effect due to the fact that transfers stimulate
the demand for home goods: ∂y˜
i
0
∂ ˜NFAi0
= ρ 1−αα . In the long run, when prices adjust, the
neoclassical wealth effect on labor supply lowers output: limt→∞
∂y˜it
∂ ˜NFAi0
= −ρ 11+φ . In
the medium run, the speed of adjustment, from the Keynesian short-run response to the
neoclassical long-run response, is controlled by the degree of price flexibility κˆ, which
affects ν.12
Note that the determinants of the Keynesian and neoclassical wealth effects are very
different. The strength of the Keynesian effect hinges on the relative expenditure share
of home goods 1−αα : the more closed the economy, the larger the Keynesian effect. The
strength of the neoclassical wealth effect depends on the elasticity of labor supply φ: the
more elastic labor supply, the larger the neoclassical wealth effect.
12Note that ν is decreasing in κˆ, with ν = 0 when prices are rigid (κˆ = 0), and ν = −∞ when prices are
flexible (κˆ = ∞).
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Positive transfers also increase home inflation. The long-run cumulated response in
the price of home produced goods equals ρ 1−αα + ρ
1
1+φ . The first term ρ
1−α
α comes from
the fact that transfers increase the demand for home goods, due to home bias. The second
term ρ 11+φ is due to a neoclassical wealth effect that reduces labor supply, raising the
wage. How fast this increase in the price of home goods occurs depends positively on the
flexibility of prices through its effect on ν.13
The effects echo the celebrated Transfer Problem controversy of Keynes (1929) and
Ohlin (1929). With home bias, a transfer generates a boom when prices are sticky, and a
real appreciation of the terms of trade when prices are flexible. The neoclassical wealth
effect associated with a transfer comes into play when prices are flexible, and generates
an output contraction and a further real appreciation.
5.3 Optimal Transfers in a Currency Union
Having solved for the positive effects of transfers, we now explore the associated norma-
tive question: what is the optimal use of transfers in a currency union? Using the fact that´ 1
0 y˜
i
tdi =
´ 1
0 p˜i
i
H,tdi = 0, we are led to the following coordinated planning problem:
min
1
2
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ 1
0
e−ρt
[
αpi(p˜i
i
H,t)
2 + (y˜it)
2 + (1− α)αθ(θ˜i)2 + αpi(pi∗t )2 + ( ˆˆy∗t )2
]
di dt (19)
subject to
˙˜piiH,t = ρp˜i
i
H,t − κˆy˜it − λαθ˜i, (20)
˙˜yit = −p˜iiH,t − ˙¯¯sit, (21)
y˜i0 = (1− α)θ˜i − ¯¯si0, (22)ˆ 1
0
θ˜idi = 0, (23)
p˙i∗t = ρpi∗t − κˆ ˆˆy∗t , (24)
where the minimization is over the variables p˜iiH,t, pi
∗
t , y˜
i
t, ˆˆy
∗
t , θ˜
i.
We can break down the planning problem into two parts. First, there is an aggregate
planning problem determining the average output gap and inflation ˆˆy∗t and pi∗t
min
1
2
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt
[
αpi(pi
∗
t )
2 + ( ˆˆy∗t )2
]
dt (25)
13Recall that ν is decreasing in the degree of price flexibility κˆ.
32
subject to (24).
Second, there is a disaggregated planning problem determining deviations from the
aggregates for output gap, home inflation and consumption smoothing, y˜it, p˜i
i
H,t and θ˜
i
t
min
1
2
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ 1
0
e−ρt
[
αpi(p˜i
i
H,t)
2 + (y˜it)
2 + (1− α)αθ(θ˜i)2
]
didt (26)
subject to (20), (21), (22), (23). Note that because the forcing variables in this linear
quadratic problem satisfy
´ 1
0
¯¯sitdi = 0, the aggregation constraint (23) is not binding. We
can therefore drop it from the planning problem. The resulting relaxed planning prob-
lem can be broken down into separate component planning problems for each country
i ∈ [0, 1]
min
1
2
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt
[
αpi(p˜i
i
H,t)
2 + (y˜it)
2 + (1− α)αθ(θ˜i)2
]
dt (27)
subject to (20), (21), (22).
Aggregates. It turns out that the optimal level of aggregates is the same whether we
allow for transfers or not: aggregates are perfectly stabilized in both cases.
Proposition 13 (Aggregates). At the optimum, union-wide aggregates are zero ˆˆy∗t = pi∗t = 0
(exactly as under laissez-faire).
This proposition, which echoes Proposition 3 from the static model, shows that the
result in Galí and Monacelli (2008), that optimal monetary policy at the union level targets
the average output gap and inflation to zero, also holds when transfers are allowed.
Optimum with rigid prices. We first treat the case of rigid prices. In this case, κˆ = 0
and the constraint set boils down to
˙˜yit = − ˙¯¯sit,
y˜i0 = (1− α)θ˜i − ¯¯si0,
which can be re-expressed as
y˜it = (1− α)θ˜i − ¯¯sit.
We are therefore left with the following component planning problem
min
1
2
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt
[
((1− α)θ˜i − ¯¯sit)2 + (1− α)αθ(θ˜i)2
]
dt.
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The solution implies the following result.
Proposition 14 (Rigid Prices). Suppose prices are rigid, then the optimum has
˜NFAi0 =
α
(1− α) + αθ
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt ¯¯sitdt,
θ˜i =
ρ
(1− α) + αθ
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt ¯¯sitdt.
Importantly, we find that ˜NFAi0 6= 0 and θ˜i 6= 0, so that the optimal solution does not
coincide with the laissez-faire solution with complete markets. Government insurance,
either through ex-post transfers or through assets markets, is a necessary feature of the
optimum.
Countries experiencing shocks that depreciate their natural terms of trade ¯¯sit should
receive positive transfers. The optimal transfers are increasing in the size and persistence
of shocks. This helps alleviate the recession resulting from the inability of the terms of
trade to adjust to that level in the short-run. With positive home bias (α < 1), transfer
increases the demand for home goods and reduces that for foreign goods—once again, a
manifestation of the Transfer Problem.
Optimal transfers are increasing the persistence of the shocks. This is intuitive. Trans-
fers affect the economy permanently and are therefore better suited to deal with persistent
shocks.
Optimal transfers ˜NFAi0 depend crucially on the the openness of the economy, as cap-
tured by the degree of home bias α. They are non-monotonic in the degree of openness.
Indeed, ˜NFAi0 is zero for both α = 0 (closed economy) and α = 1 (fully open economy).
In contrast, the coefficient θ˜i equals ρ for α = 0 and zero for α = 1.
This shows that the reason for zero transfers for α = 0 and for α = 1 are very different.
Basically for α close to 0 (extreme home bias), small transfers have large expenditure
switching effect across different goods. Small transfers therefore have large effects on
output. For α close to 1, transfers have no expenditure switching effects, and therefore
have no effects on output. So for α close to 0, we get small transfers because small transfers
are very effective (they have very large effects on output). By contrast, for α close to 1,
we get small transfers because transfers are very ineffective (they have small effects on
output).
The effectiveness of small transfers when α is small can be further illustrated in the
case α→ 0 and permanent shocks ¯¯sit = ¯¯si in which case we get perfect stabilization y˜it = 0
at the optimum (we achieve the natural allocation). We show this conclusion holds more
generally, even when prices are not perfectly rigid, in Corollary 2.
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Optimum with sticky prices in the closed economy limit α→ 0. We now return to the
case where prices are not entirely rigid, κˆ > 0, so that the costs of inflation must also be
weighed against the stabilization of output gaps. Things simplify in the closed economy
limit α→ 0.
Proposition 15 (Closed Economy Limit). In the closed economy limit, when ¯¯sit = ¯¯s
i
0e
−ψt, we
have
˜NFAi0 = 0,
θ˜i = ¯¯si0
[
1− ψ
2
(ψ+ ν)(ψ+ ρ− ν) +
ψ(ναpiκˆ + ψ)
(ψ+ ν)(ψ+ ρ− ν)2
ρ− 2ν
αpiν2 + 1
]
.
For α close to 0 (extreme home bias), small transfers have large expenditure switching
effect across different goods. Small transfers therefore have large effects on output. In-
deed, in the limit, we get θ˜i 6= 0 despite the fact that ˜NFAi0 = 0. Transfers are particularly
useful in the case where shocks are permanent: if ψ = 0 then θ˜i = ¯¯si0 and we get perfect
stabilization of output and inflation.
Corollary 2 (Closed Economy Limit, Permanent Shocks). In the closed economy limit, in
response to a permanent shock ¯¯sit = ¯¯s
i
0
˜NFAi0 = 0,
θ˜i = ¯¯si0,
and perfect stabilization is achieved: y˜it = p˜i
i
H,t = 0.
This result is striking. For rather closed economies in a currency union, modest trans-
fers achieve large stabilization benefits. This result is interesting as a contrast to the
arguments presented by McKinnon (1963) that common currencies are more costly for
economies that are more closed. McKinnon did not consider transfers, however. Our
result shows that this matters: closed economies make transfers more potent.
Numerical Exploration. We show in the appendix that θ˜i solves a simple static quadratic
minimization problem that is very tractable.
For our simulations, we follow Galí and Monacelli (2005) and set the benchmark pa-
rameters at: φ = 3, ρ = 0.04, e = 6 and ρδ = − log(0.754). We explore different values of
the remaining parameters.
Figure 2 displays the behavior of the economy with optimal transfers and with no
transfers in response to a permanent shock with ¯¯sit = 0.05. The top panel corresponds to
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α = 0.01, the middle panel to α = 0.1 and the bottom panel to α = 0.4. In this figure,
time is measured in years and inflation is annualized. The allocation without transfers
features deflation and a recession (in gaps) in the short run which vanishes in the long
run as prices adjust: the output gap increases from −5% to 0 and the inflation rate from
−3% to 0. The allocation with transfers features less deflation and smaller recession in
the short run, but lower output in the long run (in gaps). For example, with α = 0.1, the
output gap at impact is only −1.2% and the inflation rate −0.8%. The allocation without
transfer is independent of openness α. By contrast, the solution with optimal transfers is
more stable, the more closed the economy (the lower α). Optimal transfers stabilize the
economy more effectively when the economy is more closed.
Figure 3 displays a measure of stabilization due to transfers. We compare the impact
on the output gap of a shock with and without optimal transfers and report the mitigation
factor—the difference between the two as a fraction of the latter. We feed in exponentially
decaying shocks ¯¯sit = e
−ψt ¯¯si0 and normalize the initial shock ¯¯s
i
0 to 0.01. We then plot
our stabilization measure as a function of openness α and the persistence of the shock as
measured by its half life (− log(0.5)/ψ). Using the same shock, Figure 4 displays transfers
˜NFA0 as a function of the same two parameters; these numbers can be interpreted as
transfers as a fraction of GDP.
Stabilization is increasing in the persistence of the shock and decreasing in openness.
The optimal transfer is increasing in the persistence of the shock starting at zero for fully
transitory shocks, but hump-shaped as a function of openness, starting at zero at α = 0.
Significant stabilization is achieved with relatively modest transfers when the economy
is relatively closed and shocks are relatively permanent.
5.4 The Role of Fixed Exchange Rates: Countries Outside a Currency
Union
In this section, we seek to clarify the role of fixed exchange rates. We now assume that
only a subset of countries I ⊆ [0, 1] are in the currency union. These countries have flexi-
ble exchange rates. We can write down the corresponding planning problem as follows:
min
1
2
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ 1
0
e−ρt
[
αpi(p˜i
i
H,t)
2 + (y˜it)
2 + (1− α)αθ(θ˜i)2 + αpi(pi∗t )2 + ( ˆˆy∗t )2
]
di dt
subject to
p˙i∗t = ρpi∗t − κˆ ˆˆy∗t ,
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ˆ 1
0
θ˜idi = 0,
for i ∈ I,
˙˜piiH,t = ρp˜i
i
H,t − κˆy˜it − λαθ˜i,
˙˜yit = −p˜iiH,t − ˙¯¯sit,
y˜i0 = (1− α)θ˜i − ¯¯si0,
and for i /∈ I,
˙˜piiH,t = ρp˜i
i
H,t − κˆy˜it − λαθ˜i.
For countries outside the currency union the only constraint is the Phillips curve. The
Euler equation and the initial condition do not appear as constraints because with a flex-
ible exchange rate e˜it these become
˙˜yit = ˙˜e
i
t − p˜iiH,t − ˙¯¯sit,
y˜i0 = e˜
i
t + (1− α)θ˜i − ¯¯si0.
Thus, these equations simply define the required value for the exchange rate e˜it. As a
result, the solution entails p˜iiH,t = y˜
i
t = θ˜
i = 0 for i /∈ I. These countries do not send or
receive transfers. The laissez-faire solution is optimal for them.
Proposition 16 (Countries Outside the Currency Union). Laissez-faire is optimal for coun-
tries outside the currency union and they do not make or receive any transfers to other countries
θ˜i = 0. They achieve perfect stabilization p˜iiH,t = y˜
i
t = 0.
It follows that any role for transfers can be solely attributed to the fixed exchange rates
prevailing in a currency union. This result echoes Proposition 6, but solves for transfers
instead of the portfolio return taxes.
5.5 Coordination
We now consider what happens when countries do not coordinate on macro insurance.14
To do so, we now assume that countries can access complete asset markets to purchase
14We should note that the Cole-Obstfeld case may be somewhat special regarding the role of
coordination—see for example Clarida et al. (2002) for a context with flexible exchange rates. However,
given our results in the static model, which hold for any utility functions, this seems less likely to be a
concern here for the issue of transfers in a currency union.
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insurance. In the log-linearized model this amounts to having country i choose θ˜i contin-
gent on the shock realization, subject to a budget constraint, which turns out to be simply
E[θ˜i] = 0, taking the evolution of aggregates as given. Specifically, country i solves
min
1
2
E
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt
[
αpi(p˜i
i
H,t)
2 + 2αpipi∗t p˜iiH,t + (y˜
i
t)
2 + 2 ˆˆy∗t y˜it +
2α
1+ φ
y˜it + (1− α)αθ(θ˜i)2
]
dt
subject to (20), (21), (22) and E[θ˜i] = 0, where the minimization is over the (random)
variables p˜iiH,t, y˜
i
t, θ˜
i, taking ˆˆy∗t , and pi∗t as given. The path for aggregates { ˆˆy∗t ,pi∗t }t≥0
affects the solution to this problem solely through linear terms in the objective function.
The linear term 2α1+φ y˜
i
t did not appear in the coordinated problem. It can be traced back
to the fact that countries wish to manipulate their terms of trade. As a result, countries
display a preference for lower output—a form of “deflationary bias”.
A central monetary authority can choose aggregates { ˆˆy∗t ,pi∗t } by setting monetary pol-
icy subject to the following constraints. First, it must ensure that the solutions to the
uncoordinated component planning problems satisfy
´ 1
0 y˜
i
tdi = 0 and
´ 1
0 p˜i
i
H,tdi = 0. This
amounts to verifying a fixed point, that aggregates are actually equal to their proposed
path. Second, it must ensure that the aggregate Phillips curve is verified, p˙i∗t = ρpi∗t − κˆ ˆˆy∗t .
Both requirements define a set F of feasible aggregate outcomes { ˆˆy∗t ,pi∗t }t≥0. The set is a
linear space and, as we will show below, includes ˆˆy∗t = pi∗t = 0.
To determine the aggregate outcome we need to specify an objective for the central
monetary authority. We suppose it seeks to maximize aggregate welfare. Thus, the prob-
lem is the same as (25) but where the constraint set is F instead of (24). Although the
constraint sets differ, the solutions coincide and one obtains ˆˆy∗t = pi∗t = 0. Indeed, the
disaggregated variables also coincide with the coordinated outcome.
Proposition 17 (Coordination vs. No Coordination). The coordinated and uncoordinated
solutions are identical.
The lack of need for coordination emphasized in Proposition 17 also confirms the mes-
sage of Proposition 10 where we found that there were no benefits from coordination.
6 Conclusion
Even if private asset markets are perfect, we find that private insurance is imperfect
within a currency union. A role emerges for governments to arrange for macro insur-
ance. We think of this as proving one rationale for a fiscal union within a currency union.
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Our model abstracted from liquidity or solvency problems in banks or sovereign gov-
ernments. One possibility for future research is to explore how these considerations may
interact with the role for fiscal unions we have focused on here, based on macroeconomic
stabilization issues alone. We believe these issues are probably linked: problems in banks
or sovereigns negatively impact the macroeconomy, and, vice versa, macroeconomic con-
ditions due to nominal rigidities and the lack of independent monetary policy tailored to
asymmetric shocks contributes to problems in banks and sovereigns. Thus, if we had to
speculate, we would conjecture that our conclusions here would be relevant in a richer
setting with these other features.
Another direction for future work is to consider the moral hazard or commitment
problems that may limit the desirability of macroeconomic insurance. A cost-benefit ap-
praisal of a fiscal union should take this into account. We view our paper, which abstracts
from these problems, as contributing towards the benefits side of the ledger. But the cost
side is equally important and more work needs to be done.
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A Appendix
A.1 Price Setting with Constant Elasticity of Substitution
We have
1−
´
τi(s)UiCNT(s)C
i
NT(s)pi(s)ds´
UiCNT(s)C
i
NT(s)pi(s)ds
=
1
1+ τiL
ε− 1
ε
.
We can rewrite the first order condition for PiNT as
ˆ
αip(s)
αi(s)
pi(s) αi(s)CiT(s)
1
pi(s)
UiCT(s) τ
i(s)pi(s) ds = 0.
If
αip(s)
αi(s) p
i(s) is constant then this implies that
ˆ
CiNT(s)U
i
CNT(s) τ
i(s)pi(s) ds = 0.
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Thus in this case 1
1+τiL
ε−1
ε = 1 or τ
i
L = −1/ε.
A.2 Nonlinear Calvo Price Setting Equations
The equilibrium conditions for the Calvo price setting model can be expressed as follows
1− δΠe−1H,t
1− δ =
(
Ft
Kt
)e−1
,
Kt =
ε
ε− 1
1+ τL
AH,t
YtN
φ
t + δβΠ
e
H,t+1Kt+1,
Ft = YtC−σt S
−1
t Qt + δβΠe−1H,t+1Ft+1,
together with an equation determining the evolution of price dispersion
∆t = h(∆t−1,ΠH,t),
where h(∆,Π) = δ∆Πe + (1− δ)
(
1−δΠe−1
1−δ
) e
e−1 .
A.3 Proof of Proposition 12
We first solve the behavior of an economy for a given transfer θ˜i:
˙˜piiH,t = ρp˜i
i
H,t − κˆy˜it − λαθ˜i,
˙˜yit = −p˜iiH,t − ˙¯¯sit,
y˜i0 = (1− α)θ˜i − ¯¯si0.
Define E1 = [1, 0]′ and E2 = [0, 1]′. Let Xit = [p˜iiH,t, y˜
i
t]
′, Bit = [−λαθ˜i,− ˙¯¯sit]′ =
−λαθ˜iE1 − ˙¯¯sitE2. Define A =
[
ρ −κˆ
−1 0
]
. Let ν = ρ−
√
ρ2+4κˆ
2 < 0 be the (only) negative
eigenvalue of A, and Xν = [−ν, 1]′ and be an eigenvector associated with the negative
eigenvalue of A. The solution is given by
Xit = e
νtαiνXν −
ˆ ∞
t
eA(t−s)Bisds = eνtαiνXν + λαθ˜i A−1E1 +
ˆ ∞
t
˙¯¯siue
A(t−u)E2du,
where
Xi0 +
ˆ ∞
0
e−AsBisds = αiνXν,
42
E′2Xi0 = (1− α)θ˜i − ¯¯si0.
We find
αiν =
[
(1− α)− λαE′2A−1E1
]
θ˜i − ¯¯si0 −
ˆ ∞
0
˙¯¯sitE
′
2e
−AtE2dt.
from which we can infer the path for output
y˜it = e
νtαiν + λαθ˜
iE′2A−1E1 +
ˆ ∞
t
˙¯¯siuE
′
2e
A(t−u)E2du,
and inflation
p˜iiH,t = −νeνtαiν + λαθ˜iE′1A−1E1 +
ˆ ∞
t
˙¯¯siuE
′
1e
A(t−u)E2du,
Using E′2A−1E1 = −κˆ−1, and E′1A−1E1 = 0, we can then compute the transfer multipliers.
A.4 Derivation of the Optimum in Section 5.3
In Appendix A.3, we solved for the behavior of the disaggregated variables Xit = [p˜i
i
H,t, y˜
i
t]
′
for a given θ˜i. In the particular case where ¯¯sit = ¯¯s
i
0e
−ψt, we get
Xit = e
νtαiνXν + λαθ˜
i A−1E1 − ψe−ψt ¯¯si0(A + ψI)−1E2, (28)
where
αiν =
[
(1− α)− λαE′2A−1E1
]
θ˜i − ¯¯si0 + ψ ¯¯si0E′2(A + ψI)−1E2,
E1 = [1, 0]′, E2 = [0, 1]′, A =
[
ρ −κˆ
−1 0
]
, ν = ρ−
√
ρ2+4κˆ
2 < 0 is the negative eigenvalue
of A, and Xν = [−ν, 1]′ is an eigenvector associated with the negative eigenvalue of A.
We need to solve
min
θ˜i
1
2
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt
[
(Xit)
′Ω(Xit) + (1− α)αθ(θ˜i)2
]
dt,
where
Ω ≡
[
αpi 0
0 1
]
.
Replacing the Xit by its expression as a function of θ˜
i given in (28), we find that θ˜i mini-
mizes the following quadratic form:
43
1
2
1
ρ
(1− α)αθ(θ˜i)2 + 12(α
i
ν)
2 1
ρ− 2ν (X
′
νΩXν) +
1
2
(θ˜i)2(λα)2
1
ρ
(E′1(A
′)−1ΩA−1E1)
+
1
2
( ¯¯si0)
2(ψ)2
1
ρ+ 2ψ
(E′2(A′ + ψI)−1Ω(A + ψI)E2) + αiνθ˜iλα
1
ρ− ν (X
′
νΩA
−1E1)
− αiν ¯¯si0ψ
1
ρ+ ψ− ν (X
′
νΩ(A + ψI)
−1E2)− θ˜i ¯¯si0ψλα
1
ρ+ ψ
(E′1(A
′)−1Ω(A + ψI)−1E2),
where αiν is the linear function of θ˜i and ¯¯si0 derived above. Solving the corresponding FOC
gives us the solution.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 15
The solution for the closed economy limit can be obtained as a particular case of the
analysis in Appendix A.4. When ¯¯sit = ¯¯s
i
0e
−ψt, for a given θ˜i, we have that Xit = [p˜iiH,t, y˜
i
t]
′
is given by
Xit = e
νtαiνXν − ψe−ψt ¯¯si0(A + ψI)−1E2,
where
αiν = θ˜
i − ¯¯si0 + ψ ¯¯si0E′2(A + ψI)−1E2.
We find that θ˜i minimizes the following quadratic form:
1
2
(αiν)
2 1
ρ− 2ν (X
′
νΩXν)− αiν ¯¯si0ψ
1
ρ+ ψ− ν (X
′
νΩ(A + ψI)
−1E2)
+
1
2
( ¯¯si0)
2(ψ)2
1
ρ+ 2ψ
(E′2(A′ + ψI)−1Ω(A + ψI)E2).
The solution is
θ˜i = ¯¯si0
[
1− ψE′2(A + ψI)−1E2 + ψ
ρ− 2ν
ρ+ ψ− ν
X′νΩ(A + ψI)−1E2
X′νΩXν
]
.
Using E′2(A + ψI)−1E2 =
ψ
(ψ+ν)(ψ+ρ−ν) , X
′
νΩ(A + ψI)−1E2 =
ναpi κˆ+ψ
(ψ+ν)(ψ+ρ−ν) and X
′
νΩXν =
αpiν
2 + 1, we get the proposition.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 17
The planning problem of each country is linear quadratic. This has two important conse-
quences that we exploit for our proof.
First, In order for aggregates ( ˆˆy∗t ,pi∗t ) to be feasible, it must be the case that the solution
of the following problem is θ˜i = 0:
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min
1
2
E
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt
[
αpi(p˜i
i
H,t)
2 + 2αpipi∗t p˜iiH,t + (y˜
i
t)
2 + 2 ˆˆy∗t y˜it +
2α
1+ φ
y˜it + (1− α)αθ(θ˜i)2
]
dt
subject to
˙˜piiH,t = ρp˜i
i
H,t − κˆy˜it − λαθ˜i,
˙˜yit = −p˜iiH,t,
y˜i0 = (1− α)θ˜i,
E[θ˜i] = 0,
where the minimization is over the (random) variables p˜iiH,t, y˜
i
t, θ˜
i, taking ˆˆy∗t , and pi∗t as
given. Clearly ˆˆy∗t = pi∗t = 0 is feasible.
Second, for any feasible aggregates ( ˆˆy∗t ,pi∗t ), the solution of the planning problem of
each country country coincides with the disaggregated solution of the coordinated plan-
ning problem.
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Figure 2: Allocations with optimal transfers (blue) and no transfers (green). The top panel
corresponds to α = 0.01, the middle panel to α = 0.1 and the bottom panel to α = 0.4.
Time is measure in years and inflation is annualized.
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Figure 3: Optimal initial output gap mitigation at impact as a function of openness α ∈
(0, 1) and persistence (half-life of the shock) − log(0.5)ψ ∈ (0, 10).
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Figure 4: Transfers (as fraction of GDP) for a 1% shock to the terms of trade as a function
of openness α ∈ (0, 1) and persistence (half-life of the shock) − log(0.5)ψ ∈ (0, 10).
47
